Under former President Mbeki, South Africa provoked international dismay and criticism when it tried to block United Nations censure of Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe for gross human rights abuses. In the case of Sudan, Pretoria stood accused of turning a blind eye to Khartoum's excessive and indiscriminate violence in Darfur, betraying South Africa's own struggle for democracy and commitment to promoting h u m a n r i g h t s . T h i s a r t i c l e s e e k s t o s h e d l i g h t o n P r e t o r i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y b y explaining its position on Darfur and exploring the relationship between ideas and i n t e r e s t s i n s h a p i n g t h e p o l i c y . I a r g u e t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n o n D a r f u r w a s n o t unfathomable or realist, as some observers claimed, but was based on the core ideas of South Africa's foreign policy: the African Renaissance; quiet diplomacy as the most effective means of dealing with pariah regimes; solidarity with African governments under pressure from the West; and an anti-imperialist paradigm that provided the lens through which the government viewed the global order, defined the country's interests and conceptualised human rights. Whereas most studies of Pretoria's foreign conduct pay little heed to the policies of the ruling party, I show that the conduct flowed logically from the party's anti-imperialist ideology.
7 appropriate framework for resolving the Darfur crisis and establishing a "viable, stable and democratic federal state". 22 In relation to Darfur, Mbeki focused on the necessity of mounting a UN peacekeeping operation. AMIS was so under-resourced and ineffectual in the midst of intense violence that its replacement by a larger and better equipped international force was widely held to be essential and urgent. Khartoum was strongly opposed to this move, however, and Mbeki laboured to overcome its obduracy. In 2006 he went to Sudan to press Bashir to approve a UN takeover of AMIS; 23 when he visited Sudan the following year one of his aims was to encourage implementation of the AU-UN agreement on UNAMID; 24 and when he hosted Bashir in Cape Town in 2007 he insisted that UNAMID should be deployed without further delay. 25 Given Pretoria's strategic perspective on dealing with pariah regimes, discussed in the following section, Mbeki believed that his mission to sway Bashir required 'quiet diplomacy'
and that public criticism would diminish his influence.
Pariahs, Solidarity and Commerce
A second explanation for Pretoria's efforts to block UN censure of Khartoum lies in its conviction that the international community is most likely to induce positive change in pariah regimes -like Zimbabwe, Burma, Iran and Sudan -through diplomatic engagement. Condemnation, coercion and isolation, it argued, would only heighten the regime's intransigence. Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma summed up this perspective as follows: "Our own national experience has taught us the value of seeking negotiated solutions to problems, no matter how intractable they may at first seem, and of engaging all the relevant role players in a dialogue". 26 Dlamini-Zuma added that this thinking had greatly influenced South Africa's votes in the UN Security Council in 2007. 27 In relation to the Security Council's concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, South
Africa maintained that sanctions "should be utilised with great caution, and only to support the resumption of political dialogue and negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution"; negotiations were essential because "no one will win through a process of confrontation that can lead to disastrous consequences in a highly volatile region".
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In the case of Burma, South Africa voted against a Security Council resolution urging the junta to ease repression and release political prisoners, asserting that the resolution would compromise the 'good offices' of the UN Secretary-General, whose recent diplomatic forays had opened a "window of hope and communication".
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The most prominent example of Pretoria's preference for soft diplomacy was its approach to the political crisis in Zimbabwe. In response to critics who cried out for an emphatic denunciation of Harare's violations of human rights and the rule of law, government officials were adamant that 'shouting from the rooftops', as they put it, when he acted as a "bully" against the Nigerian dictatorship and "everyone stood aside and we were isolated".
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These comments capture the third major reason for Pretoria's silence on Sudan's human rights abuses, namely the political culture of unity and solidarity that inhibits
African governments from criticising each other publicly. Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonial rule, this posture remains a strategic imperative for weak regimes that are buffeted by domestic and external challenges. Notwithstanding their differences and disputes, the regimes close ranks when they are under pressure from t h e W e s t . K n o x C h i t i y o d e s c r i b e s t h e t e n d e n c y a s a n i d e o l o g y o f " p a t r i o t i c blackness". 32 It can also be understood as an anti-imperialist construct since it is expressed through a discourse of resistance to 'the dictates of the neo-colonial powers' and it is not confined to African governments but encompasses developing countries elsewhere in the world.
It is possible that a fourth explanation for Pretoria's protective attitude towards should bring a better life to billions of the poor, the rich and the powerful have consistently sought to ensure that whatever happens, the existing power relations are not altered and therefore the status quo remains. … Indeed, until the ideals of freedom, justice and equality characterise this premier world body, the dominant will forever dictate to the dominated and the interests of the dominated, which are those of the majority of humanity, would be deferred in perpetuity. 
Ideas and interests in foreign policy
Research and theories that seek to explain the policies adopted by governments are dominated by rationalist and other materialist accounts that concentrate on the pursuit of interests and pay little attention to the role and impact of ideas. 56 Yet it seems clear from the preceding sections that ideas have been pivotal in shaping the vision, goals and strategies of Pretoria's foreign policy. The vision and goals include grand ideals (e.g. the African Renaissance and equitable global relations); they rest on ethical and normative principles (e.g. equity, human dignity and respect for international law);
and they are pursued through strategies based on ideas about the relationship between means and ends (e.g. democratic governance and neo-liberal economic policies as the route to the African Renaissance, and negotiations as the most effective way of addressing conflicts and crises).
The literature that does explore the role of ideas in policy-making focuses on the ideas, also at the foreground of debates, that facilitate policy-making by specifying how to solve particular problems.
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As discussed in the previous sections, cognitive paradigms and normative frameworks were central components of South African foreign policy under Mbeki. In contrast to
Campbell's portrayal, however, they were not limited to 'taken-for-granted' ideas, they did not lie in the background of policy debates and they did more than constrain policy options. Instead, the Africanist and anti-imperialist concepts and values were at the forefront of an exceedingly ambitious foreign policy whose goals included "the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment" and "the transformation of our continent and the global environment". 59 The concepts and values produced a foreign policy characterized by idealism, activism and a kind of secular evangelism. A set of ideas drove the policy and the policy was intended to promote those ideas.
To claim that ideas are determinants of foreign policy is not to say that they are more important than interests or that ideas and interests are dichotomous. Rather, the linkages between ideas and interests should be viewed as a rich terrain for empirical investigation and theoretical reflection when seeking to explain the content of government policies and the varied responses of different countries to common problems. As illustrated below with reference to Campbell's typology, the foreign policy of even a single country can exhibit a range of different relationships between ideas and interests.
In the case of world culture, transnational ethical concerns can become so compelling that they override established interests and practices. ANC policy statements, generally ignored in studies of South African foreign policy, have considerable explanatory power, expressing in stark terms the ideas that lay at the heart of the government's approach. 70 Five themes are relevant to the present discussion:
First, the fundamental principles of foreign policy -which include the promotion of human rights and democracy, the promotion of world peace and the development of the African continent -are underpinned by "our anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-neocolonial commitments in international relations". 71 Second, an activist international agenda is closely linked to domestic priorities. The foreign policy principles referred to above "should be seen as an essential part of defining the national interest" since global reforms will contribute to deepening and consolidating "the National Democratic Revolution" in South Africa. 72 Third, the anti-imperialist struggle is not a relic of history but rather a matter of great contemporary relevance. There are several reasons for this: the primary features of the international order include the "ever-growing conflict between a highly industrialised and affluent North and an impoverished, under-developed, highly populated South"; 73 content and process of globalisation are dominated by alliances around the US, the "hyper-power" bent on regime change, whose conduct is "reminiscent of empires of a bygone era". It is hard to fault the analysis of inequitable global relations that underpinned the antiimperialist world view but it is equally hard to see any productive results emanating from the strategy of blocking international action against dictatorial regimes. This strategy did nothing to alter the inequities of the international system and yielded no benefits to South Africa or the South. The only winners were the dictators and the clear losers were their victims. The poor, who were the intended beneficiaries of the anti-imperialist project, ended up sacrificed on its altar. This outcome was not emancipatory or in any way transformative. In so far as it helped to retain repressive governments in power, the strategy was reactionary.
Pretoria's claim that international pressure on problematic regimes merely heightens their intransigence, and that soft diplomacy is therefore the only viable option, is plainly ahistorical. When Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma defended South Africa's voting record on the UN Security Council by stating that the country's experience had taught it the value of seeking negotiated solutions, she ignored the fact that South 83 Ibid, pg. 5. 84 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
